Tumultuous year by Barbara Bennett
January 30, 1981 
Tumultuous Year 
Banking and financial activity followed a 
roller-coaster pattern in 1980. Rapid changes 
in economic activity, in credit demands, and 
in inflation expectations all contributed to 
equally rapid shifts in interest rates during that 
tumultuous year. Interest rates also reached 
historical peaks-not  once buttwice-under 
the spur of inflation and a policy response 
designed to curb inflation by limiting money-
supply growth. 
The growth in financial assets consequently 
slowed considerably from the earlier pace, 
although funds generally remained available 
during most of  the year. The bond market, 
despite a highly erratic growth pattern, fi-
nanced a record amount of new corporate 
issues. Banks meanwhile coped well with 
1980's volatile environment, posting rela-
tively strong earnings in spite of slower loan 
growth and higher costs of  funds. 
The Federal Reserve encountered difficulties 
in its struggle against severe inflation, reflect-
ing the Fed's problem of being "the only 
game in town" in the absence of parallel 
tightening actions from government fiscal 
policy. Following a change in operating 
techniques adopted in October 1979, the Fed 
tried to limit money growth during 1980 by 
controlling the quantity of bank reserves 
rather than by tightly pegging the cost of  bank 
reserves (the Federal-funds rate). But market 
participants had trouble adjusting to this new 
operating environment, which implied a 
broader range of interest-rate fluctuations 
according to changes in business and credit 
conditions. Indeed, interest rates followed a 
roller-coaster course, rising to historic highs 
during the speculative boom of early 1980, 
falling sharply in the spring period, and then 
rising to new peak levels in the late fall 
months. 
Volatile credit markets 
Total funds raised in 1980's financial markets 
fell below the previousyear's total, according 
to preliminary estimates, because ofthe rec-
ord cost of credit and a recession-induced 
decline in overall credit demand. Nonethe-
less, the government sector's share of  the total 
increased substantially during the year. The 
Federal debt grew at least twice as fast as in 
1979, as inflation and recession pressures 
boosted Federal spending while recession 
dampened tax revenues, forcing the Treasury 
to step up the pace of its fund-raising efforts. 
State and local governments were also more 
active in debt markets, especially through 
increased sales of  tax-exempt mortgage rev-
enue bonds. Federally-sponsored agency 
debt, by contrast, grew at a somewhat slower 
pace than in 1979. 
In the private sector, corporate businesses 
raised roughly the same amountoffunds as in 
1979, primarily in the long-term end of  the 
market. In fact, corporate long-term debt 
grew by a record amount in 1980-more 
than half again as much as in 1979-despite 
widespread fears about the "disappearance" 
of  the bond market. New cash offeri ngs of 
corporate equities also grew rapidly during 
the year. In contrast, the mortgage and con-
sumer-debt markets showed considerable 
weakness, reflecting the sharp decline in 
consumer housing and auto demand, as well 
as the impact of the credit-restraint program 
and the drying up of savings inflows at mort-
gage-lending institutions. 
Financial growth patterns reflected not only 
the wide swings in business activity, but also 
the wide swings in interest rates that led to 
new record highs atthe spring and fall peaks. 
The yield curve traced by instruments of 
gradually increasing maturity remained in-
verted for much of  the year -a  typical infla-
tion phenomenon -as  short-term rates rose 
above long-term rates during the spring and 
again during the fall months. 
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to 11  percent in August, and then rose again 
to 21 Y2  percent in December. Similarly, cor-
porate Aaa-rated bond rates rose from 11 Y2 
percent in January to 14 percent in March, 
fell to 11  percent in June, and rose again to 
over 14 percent in December. Corporate-
borrowing patterns shifted strongly in re-
sponse to these sharp rate fluctuations. 
Businesses relied heavily on short-term 
borrowings during the several episodes of 
sharply rising rates, but they issued massive 
amounts of long-term debt when rates fell in 
the spring months, in an effort to "lock in" 
their cost of funds and reduce their reliance 
on short-term financi.ng. Mortgage borrowing 
followed a similar stop-and-go pattern, as 
rates rose to a record 1  8 percent in the spri ng, 
dropped to 12 percent in the late summer, 
and then approached the earl ier peak around 
year-end. 
Sluggish bank credit 
Bank credit increased only 9 percent in 
1980-far  below the growth of  the 1978-79 
period -and much of  that growth was con-
centrated in new securities investment rather 
than new loans. The loan slowdown largely 
reflected a massive runoff of consumer 
loans -down more than 5 percent for the 
year-as consumers avoided taking on new 
debt even after the midyeartermination of  the 
credit-restraint program. 
Business loans, in contrast, grew at a rela-
tively healthy 11-percent pace over the year, 
despite a decline in this category during the 
spring recession period. Business loans ex-
panded rapidly in the fall, as many banks 
offered financing to firms that couldn't find 
funds in the corporate-bond market-and 
additionally, offered sub-prime loan rates to 
many firms in an attempt to compete with the 
commercial-paper market. Banks' real-estate 
loans increased nearly 8 percent during the 
year-and in fact increased most rapidly in 
those several crunch periods when many 
savings-and-Ioan associations ran out of 
funds. 
Funds for financing this bank-credit expan-
sion were costly to come by, because of  the 
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continuing shiftoffunds from "core" deposits 
(demand and passbook-savings deposits) to 
more expensive sources acquired at market-
determined interest rates. The most rapid 
growth occurred in small-denomination time 
deposits, which inCluded the popular 6-
month and 30-month money-market certifi-
cates. Banks also relied heavily on large-
denomination ($100,000 and over) time 
deposits, especially in those several tight-
money periods when they actively sought 
lendable funds. 
Stable bank earnings 
Bank earnings in 1980 exceeded the 1979 
peak, according to preliminary evidence, 
despite the impact of record interest rates on 
both sides of banks' balance sheets. Whole-
sale (commercially oriented) banks exper-
ienced a large increase in operating income 
because, with their substantial floating-rate 
loan base, prime-rate increases raised the 
return on a sizable portion of all their assets. 
But by the same token, they experienced 
dramatic increases in the cost of  funds, be-
cause of  their heavy reliance on short-term, 
interest-sensitive liabilities. 
Retail (consumer oriented) banks experi-
enced almost the reverse situation. Because 
of  the concentration of  their assets in fixed-
rate mortgage and consumer loans, they 
failed to receive higher returns on the bulk of 
their portfolios when rates increased. But 
because of  the concentration of  thei r deposits 
in fixed-rate "core" deposits, they generally 
experienced smaller increases in interest 
costs-€xcept for those cases where funds 
shifted out of such deposits into certificates 
bearing market-determined interest rates. 
On balance, increases in banks' operating 
income generally outpaced increases in their 
cost of funds. Still, results varied widely for 
individual banks because of  their different 
responses' to 1980's unsettled credit-market 
conditions. The net interest'spread -the  dif-
ference between the rate of return on assets 
and the rate needed to cover the cost of 
funds-narrowed severely for many banks 
during the early-year crunch, and again dur-ingthesimilarperiod in late fall. Nonetheless, 
the banking industry generally dealt very well 
with 1980's highly volatile credit markets. 
Continued uncertainty 
The volatility in credit demands and interest 
rates that characterized 1980 shou Id be less 
evident in 1981, because of greater expected 
stabi I  ity of  business activity and greater fam i  1-
iarity of market participants with Federal Re-
serve operating procedures. In contrastto last 
year, the economy will not be subject to 
the fluctuations associated with the imposi-
tion and later termination of a direct credit-
restraint program. Still, interest rates may 
remain high by historical standards, reflecting 
the continued problem of inflation as well as 
a tight Federal Reserve policy designed to 
reduce money growth over time. 
Nonetheless, overall credit demand may re-
main relatively strong, despite high interest 
rates and a sluggish economic recovery. The 
Federal government should again be a heavy 
borrower because of  another substantial bud-
get deficit in fiscal 1981-currently  esti-
mated at $55 billion. Business borrowing 
may also remain strong, because in a sluggish 
economy, most firms won't be able to gener-
ate enough funds internally to finance capital 
investment and inventories. Banks undoubt-
edly will supply a substantial portion of  the 
needed funds, at least until corporations find 
more attractive terms in the bond market. On 
the other hand, high interest rates and weak-
ened income prospects may depress the de-
mand for consumer and mortgage credit, 
producing little growth in those loan cate-
gories during the year. 
In this environment, banks should benefit 
from the acquisition of high-yielding earning 
assets, but will also haveto continue paying 
high rates for lendable funds. In fact, even 
core deposits may become more expensive 
in 1981, as bank customers shift funds out of 
zero-interest checking accounts to interest-
bearing NOW accounts. But overall, banks 
are relatively optimistic about 1981, because 
of  the experience they gained in dealing with 
1980's difficult environment. 
Barbara Bennett 
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Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
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Dollar  Percent 
9,409  6.8 
9,603  8.4 
3,884  11.6 
6,631  15.1 
- 431  - 1.8 
104  8.8 
- 387  - 5.4 
193  1.2 
- 2,059  - 4.5 
- 1,703  5.1 
674  2.4 
15,217  25.8 
14,449  28.8 
7,259  33.8 
Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended  Comparable 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficien~y (  -) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  + )/Net borrowed (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 





1/7/81  year-ago period 
n.a.  68 
180  208 
n.a.  139 
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